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LIST OP PARTIES
The parties to this action are:
1.

Reed Maxfield, a Plaintiff and Appellant.

2.

Utah's Great Game Preserve, a Plaintiff and

Appellant.
3. Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.
4. State of Utah, by and through Utah State Department
of Social Services, Third-party Defendants and Co-respondents.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i).

This appeal is from an Order of the

trial court dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action because of
the plaintiff's failure to diligently prosecute.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error

in dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action for failure to diligently prosecute.
2.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error

in denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the
pleadings, affidavits, and factual circumstances surrounding this
transaction.
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error
in denying plaintiff's Motion for an Order Granting plaintiff the
immediate right to redeem prior to trial of the case on its
merits.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
None
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves disputes relating to title and
right of possession of two parcels of land situated in Salt lake
County, Utah.
Because title is the primary issue, a brief chronology
of events outlining the chain of "ownership" may be helpful to the
court.
1.

Lester and Maxine Romero were fee title owners prior

to April 9, 1979. (R-19)
2.

Prior to April 9, 1979, Lester and Maxine Romero

represented that they had assigned and sold the properties to
Beaver Investment who subsequently assigned and sold its interest
to Golden Circle Investment.

Lester Romero controlled the enti-

ties known as Beaver Investment and Golden Circle Investment.
3.

On April 9, 1979, Lester and Maxine Romero conveyed

the properties by quit-claim deed to Golden Circle Investment.
(R-19)
4.

On April 9, 1979, Golden Circle Investment conveyed

the properties by corporate quit-claim deed to Reed Maxfield.
5.

On June 29, 1979, the State of Utah, Division of

Social Services, obtained a judgment based upon fraud against
Lester Romero. (R-20)
6.

Reed Maxfield recorded the quit-claim deed from
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Golden Circle to Maxfield on March 25, 1980. (R-20)
7.

The properties were sold by Sheriff's sale on

October 1, 1980. (R-20)
8.

The defendants Owen and Carol Rushton purchased the

property at the Sheriff's sale for the amount of the judgment
against Lester Romero together with the costs of sale. (R-35,
R-41)
9.

Reed Maxfield filed a Complaint on October 20, 1980,

against the Rushtons alleging that he was the fee title owner of
the property.

Subsequently, on November 3, 1980, plaintiff filed

an Amended Complaint. (R-2)
10.

Defendants Rushtons filed a Motion to Dismiss upon

the grounds that they were innocent third-party purchasers, that
Maxfield had not joined the State of Utah as a necessary party
defendant, and that the relationship between Maxfield and Romero
must be established in order to determine if the purported deed of
conveyance was valid. (R-8)
11.

On March 11, 1981, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment which was denied March 27, 1981. (R-13, R-52)
12.

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal

to the Supreme Court in April, 1981.
13.

Said Appeal was denied.

On April 2, 1981, defendants Rushton did file an

Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint joining the State
of Utah in the action as a third-party defendant. (R-53, R-57)
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14.

On June 19, 1984, plaintiff filed another Motion for

Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge David Dee on September
25, 1984. A trial date was set for January 10, 1985. (R-215)
15.

On September 6, 1984, the defendants Rushton, pursu-

ant to court order, filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim.
(R-183, R-231)
16.

Plaintiff has never filed a reply to the Amended

Counterclaim.
17.

On or about December 10, 1984, plaintiff filed a

Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint.

The defendants

objected to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint upon the
grounds that it was inappropriate to add new parties to the
action and different causes of action including fraud and punitive
damages which sound in tort and completely change plaintifffs theory of the case upon the eve of trial. (R-244, R-255)
18.

In December 1984, the plaintiff filed a Petition in

Bankruptcy for a Chapter 11 proceeding. (R-260)
19.

The trial date scheduled for January 10, 1985, was

stayed by filing of Notice of Bankruptcy. (R-258)
20.

As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the plaintiff

caused the claim against the defendants to be assigned to the Utah
Great Game Preserve, a Utah corporation controlled by the plaintiff and his family.

Thereafter, the Stay was lifted enabling the

case to be heard in the Third Judicial District Court. (Bankruptcy
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84A-03391)
21.

On June 1, 1987, Judge Young, after hearing argu-

ments from the parties, set a scheduling order which included the
first place trial setting of September 15, 1987. (R-313)
22.

On August 10, 1987, plaintiff's counsel filed a

Motion to continue the trial date which was denied on August 17,
1987. (R-332, R-355, R-424)
23.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims by

any party against plaintiff on August 11, 1987. (R-359).
Defendants replied to the plaintiff's Motion on August 14, 1987.
(R-385)
24.

Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on August

19, 1987. (R-404).

Defendants objected to filing the Third

Amended Complaint. (R-433).
25.

On August 24, 1987, the court denied plaintiff's

Motion to Dismiss claims against plaintiff, Motion to File a Third
Amended Complaint and denied defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R-4 36)
26.

At the Pre-trial Hearing on August 31, 1987, with

all parties present with counsel, the plaintiff presented a proposed Third Amended Complaint enlarging upon the Second Amended
Complaint and including a civil rights cause of action.
Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel moved to be allowed to withdraw.
After the court heard arguments from all the parties including the
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plaintiff individually, the court dismissed plaintiff's causes of
action for failure to prosecute. (R-437, R-438)
27.

Judgment was entered on September 30, 1987. (R-449)

28.

Plaintiff filed an objection to judgment which was

denied. (R-470, R-471)
29.

Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal. (R-469)

The plaintiff's cause of action has been before the
Third Judicial District Court from October 1980 to September 1987.
The record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff, by his own
conduct, has continually delayed this matter by change of legal
counsel, amended causes of action, and bankruptcy proceedings.
All of the plaintifffs actions have been to the detriment of the
defendants who, as innocent purchasers, have been compelled to pay
mortgage payments owing at the time of the Sheriff's sale,
together with taxes, insurance and the maintenance of old houses
without the benefit of the Sheriff's Deed necessary to convey
title. (R-73)
Subsequent to the Sheriff's sale of the two parcels of
real property on October 1, 1980, the plaintiff has had within
his power, the right, and capability of an expeditious trial
establishing the validity of his claim to fee title and his right
to redeem.
The defendants Rushton are innocent third-party pur-
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chasers of the real property at the Sheriff's sale, having no
relationship with Maxfield or Romero.
The Rushtons have continuously pressed for completion
of discovery and setting prompt hearing dates.

Defendants have

filed three Requests for Trial Settings and obtained four (4)
trial settings.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, has objected to

the Notices of Readiness, trial date settings, and made no effort
whatsoever to have the matter expeditiously tried on its merits
after plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment were denied.
The Motions for Summary Judgment were not granted
because it was clear that there were genuine issues of both law
and fact.
The plaintiff, failing to successfully obtain a Summary
Judgment, then proceeded to seek the right to immediate redemption without first proving that he had valid title to the
property.

The trial court properly denied these Motions.
Therefore, rather than seek an early trial date to

resolve the issues, the plaintiff filed bankruptcy, had the cause
of action assigned and transferred to a family corporation
(Utah's Great Game preserve) and filed a Second and Third Amended
Complaint for the purpose of adding defendants and causes of
action that substantially changed plaintiff's original theory of
the case.
The court on August 31, 1987, at the pretrial
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conference, upon being confronted with continuing efforts by the
plaintiff to delay the case again for non-meritorious reasons,
dismissed the case for failure to timely prosecute, (R-437,
R-438)
The delays have been very detrimental to the Rushtons
who have been required to pay all of the monthly mortgage
payments, taxes, insurance and borrow money to repair the houses
despite the fact that they have not been able to obtain a
Sheriff's Deed for seven (7) years due to the delaying tactics of
the plaintiff•
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
This matter has been pending before the Third Judicial
District Court in Salt Lake County since October 20, 1980, when
the plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging he was the fee title
owner and that the State of Utah had caused to be conducted an
improper Sheriff's sale.
Since that date, the plaintiff has filed two amended
complaints and on the date of the pre-trial, August 31, 1987,
sought to file a Third Amended Complaint seeking relief on an
entirely new theory involving the violation of civil rights and
seeking punitive damages against the various defendants including
the State of Utah. (R-404)
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Counsel for the defendants Rushton have filed two
Certificates of Readiness for Trial, to wit:

February 8, 1984

(R-82), and November 24, 1986 (R-264), and a Motion for Immediate
Trial Setting on April 27, 1987 (R-291).

On each occasion, plain-

tiff objected to said requests on the grounds that more discovery
was necessary•
The court has scheduled four trial date settings,
namely:

April 30, 1984 (R-89); September 10, 1984 (R-90); January

10, 1985 (R-215); and September 15, 1987 (R-309).
The court file is replete with pleadings on the part of
the defendants seeking a court determination of this matter and
plaintiff objecting to every effort to have the issues tried or in
the alternative, doing nothing in a constructive effort to resolve
the issues raised by the pleadings.

However, it should be noted

that counsel for plaintiff has taken the depositions of Owen
Rushton, Carol Rushton and Stephen Schwendiman.

Defendants have

taken the deposition of the plaintiff Maxfield.

All the deposi-

tions were completed before the end of 1984, three and one-half
years ago.
All the delays have been directly caused by the plaintiff, including the filing of a petition in bankruptcy on December
10, 1984, which included the successful effort of having this
cause of action, as an asset of Maxfield, to be transferred to the
Maxfield "close family11 corporation known as Utah's Great Game
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Preserve for the payment of a "debt" thus preventing creditors
from attaching any interest in this cause of action.

Bankruptcy

Judge John Allen lifted a Stay Against Proceeding and remanded the
matter to the Third Judicial District Court where it continued to
flounder despite defendants1 efforts to have the matter heard.
Finally, at the pretrial conference on August 31, 1987
(R-437), the plaintiff's counsel (in the presence of Maxfield)
again tried to amend the Complaint changing the entire theory of
the case, moved for further continuance, and sought to withdraw as
counsel upon the grounds that he had not been paid.
then gave Mr. Maxfield an opportunity to speak.

The court

After hearing

argument from all the parties and their counsel, the court correctly ruled that the plaintiff's case must be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Seven years was adequate time to frame the

issues and theory of the case, complete discovery, and have the
matter tried.
The record shows that between August 31, 1987, and the
present time, three separate lawyers have entered appearances in
addition to pro se actions on the part of the plaintiff.

It is

evident that there is no end in sight if the court does not take
appropriate action to prevent abuse of the court system to the
detriment of the Rushtons who have been making mortgage payments,
insurance premiums and taxes as well as incurring maintenance
expense for seven years without a Sheriff's Deed due to the delaying actions of the plaintiff.
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
"The ruling of the court below will not be disturbed
unless the record plainly shows that the court below
abused its discretion." Westinghouse Electric Supply
Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P2d 876
(1975) .
This is true whether a party to the action moves the
court for an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute or the
court acts on its own.

Brasher Motor and Finance Company v.

Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P2d 464 (1969).
The Supreme Court has generally followed five (5) basic
factors to determine if dismissal is justified.
1.

They are:

The conduct of both parties.

2. The opportunity each has had to move the case
forward.
3. What each of the parties have done to move the
case forward.
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been
caused to the other side.
5. And, most important, whether injustice may
result from the dismissal.
(See K.L.C. Inc. v. Ron McLean, 656 P.2d 986)
In applying these five standards, it is conclusively
established that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action.
First, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the plaintiff did anything to encourage the setting of a trial
date.

When plaintiff1s Motions for Summary Judgment were not
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granted, the plaintiff did nothing except to file a petition in
bankruptcy and seek to prevent creditors from claiming an interest
in his "alleged title" to the properties which are the subject of
this case.
On the other hand, defendants took the appropriate
depositions, filed Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents (which were only answered after defendants filed a
Motion to Compel [R-180]), and filed two Certificates of Readiness
and Motion for Immediate Trial over a three-year period.
Defendants did everything possible to have this matter heard.
Second, each party had an equal opportunity to move the
case forward.

The plaintiff had the burden of proof, but it was

the defendants who were continually seeking a resolution of the
issues.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff

was justified in failing to proceed expeditiously.
Third, the actions taken by the parties to move the case
forward is described in paragraph first above.

However, it is

submitted that the plaintiff has not only taken no affirmative
steps to move his case forward, he has continually fils^d objections and obstructed the defendants and the court from moving
forward.

The file includes plaintiff's objections to every

Certificate of Readiness for Trial, Motion for Immediate Trial
Setting, or court orders seeking to schedule an orderly procedure
to conclude the case.
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Fourth, the defendants have done nothing to prejudice or
create difficulties for the plaintiff.

Any prejudice claimed to

be suffered by the plaintiff has arisen from his own acts or
omissions.

The plaintiff's objections to defendants1 efforts

seeking to go forward, his failure to respond to Request for
Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories, and his
continual Motions to amend the Complaint, have prejudiced defendants from having a hearing on the issues within a reasonable
time.

It is submitted that seven (7) years is not reasonable,

especially when the issues are not that complex.
Fifth, no injustice will result from this court affirming the trial court's Order of Dismissal.

Not only did the

plaintiff take every step to avoid an expeditious trial, he cannot
suffer any financial loss because through

his personal bankruptcy

petition, he caused any interest he had in the subject property to
be conveyed to Utah's Great Game Preserve, a Utah corporation.

A

party cannot be heard to complain when he has been the creator of
his own world of problems.

It was the plaintiff who abused the

court system and cannot now be heard to complain that the judicial system has taken inappropriate action.
On the other hand, the defendants Rushton will suffer
great injustice if the court Order of Dismissal is not upheld.
They were purchasers in good faith of the property pursuant to a
Sheriff's sale October 1, 1980 (R-35, R-41).
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Since that date,

when they paid the amount required at the Sheriff's sale, they
have been compelled to repair two houses that were in a bad state
of repair, paid monthly mortgage payments on both properties, paid
real property taxes for the years 1980 through 1987, paid insurance premiums and substantial attorney fees, all of which exceeded
the limited rental income they were able to receive (R-73).

The

Rushtons are both elderly and it is important that they be allowed
to secure the property Sheriff's Deed and be assured they can continue to pay for the properties knowing that they will obtain
legal title.
In support of this great expense, Carol Rushton executed
an Affidavit dated December 8, 1981 (R-73), which is part of the
record and which outlined expenses for the first year as follows:
Repairs to property at 3020 W. 2995 S.
Repairs to property at 606 Colorado St.
Insurance
Delinquent mortgage payments
Granger-Hunter Water District
Repair furnace
December 22, 1980 (First Security mortgage
payment)
Interest paid on loan taken out to improve
the property
Attorneys fees to date

$7,048.06
694.09
150.00
431.00
60.00
30.00
97.00
272.52
872.52

Since 1981, the defendants have carried the burden of
similar charges.
To permit the plaintiff to return to the Third Judicial
District Court and pursue this matter would constitute a substantial injustice to the Rushtons.

The plaintiff, by his conduct and
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his bankrupt financial condition, has clearly demonstrated that he
should not be allowed to continue his irresponsible actions to the
detriment of the Rushtons.

To grant further hearings and to grant

any right of redemption under these circumstances would be to compound the injustice that the plaintiff has already committed.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in K.L.C. Inc. v.
McLean, 656 P2d 986 at page 987 declared:
Under such circumstances, a trial could serve no
useful purpose. The protraction of the case for fourteen years, and the hopelessness of any recovery by
either side justified the trial courtfs dismissal on
plaintiff's motion, as might also have occurred sua
sponte and on the court's own motion.
It is submitted that the trial court in reviewing the
pleadings and considering all of the circumstances not only did
not abuse his discretion, but carried out the court's obligation
to provide fair and expeditious hearings for litigating parties.
This view has always been the findings and ruling of the
Utah Supreme Court.

Wright v. Howe, et al., 150 P. 956 (Utah

1915); Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, et al., 29 Utah 2nd 259, 508
P.2d 528 (1973); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P2d 1323 (Utah 1975);
Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Johnson v.
Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1977); Dept. of Social
Services v. Romero, 609 P2d 1323 (Utah 1980).
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II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Historically, the Utah Supreme Court has not reversed a
trial's court with respect to rulings on Motions for Summary
Judgment unless there is clearly an abuse of discretion or the
trial court is in error as a matter of law.

The burden is upon

the moving party and the defending party is given the benefit of
every doubt in order to insure that parties, if legally deserving,
shall have their day in court.
The plaintiff argues that his first Motion for Summary
Judgment filed before an answer had been filed or any discovery
had taken place was error as a matter of law.

The defendants were

only aware that they were innocent purchasers of real property
being sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to enforce a judgment against a fee title owner of the property by the name of
Romero.
After plaintiff filed his first Motion for Summary
Judgment (R-13), he filed a Motion and Notice of Hearing to Extend
Time for Redemption and Motion for Deposit of Funds into Court
(R-50).
On March 27, 1981, the court heard arguments on
defendants' Motions to Dismiss and plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment upon
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^
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g r o u n d s that :i t was premati lr e

(R- 52 )

H o w e v e r , the court did grant plaintiff an extension of
the redemption perio

; t ^ t h e r m o r e , the court authorized the

defendants b :
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Thereafter,
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grantee tne parties furtne: discovery at pre-trial conference on
June 19, 19^4 ^R~iS8;, therefore, a nearing on Summary Judgment

After discovery had been "completed, 11 the plaintiff
filed a Second Amended Complaint adding new defendants a-

_: September 2h , "96 4

-.—

- ^1

the plai ntiff's Motion for

Summar T ~ judgment was neard ana aenied.
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fi

i l ea;

• *

a] was set for

On November 30, 1984, plaintiff's Motions relating to
rights of redemption were argued and the court reserved ruling
until date of trial• (R-230)
On December 10, 1984, the plaintiff filed a petition in
bankruptcy, thereby staying further proceedings. (R-260)
Under these facts and circumstances, there is no factual
or legal basis for reversing the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's first and second Motions for Summary Judgment.
It is difficult to understand the legal reasoning of the
plaintiff in seeking a reversal of the court's denial of the first
Motion for Summary Judgment when subsequently an Intermediate
Appeal was denied, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint
and thereafter filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment which
was also denied.

Certainly, there could be no legal rational

basis that could allow the plaintiff's first Motion for Summary
Judgment to survive all of the intervening actions and be heard
again.
The plaintiff/appellant strenuously argues that the
Affidavit filed by Rushtons' counsel does not adequately raise
questions of law or fact to successfully challenge the
plaintiff's first Motion for Summary Judgment.

This superficial

argument was denied by the trial court upon several grounds:
First, there had been a Motion to Dismiss filed which on its face
raised several serious issues; namely, the State of Utah had not
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been joi ned as a necessary party, the defendants Ri 1 shtc • i 1 wer e
i ru locen t: bona fi de third-party purchasers under a Sheriff" s sale,
and that the relationship between Maxfield and Romero raised a
question as to the validity

'

tu

-

,3

ed fimn Rnnu i • I. Mixfi e] d.

Secondly, there ha: ceer. inadequate time to complete
discovery.
Third];/

defendants should be given adequate t ime to

file an answer to raise the .legal issues of fraud, necessary
joinder and the validity of the purported deeds of conveyanop.
I" h k- i" o 1.i [ I " i •; (j e n i a I «: • > I t h e ! 1 o t i on for Summa r y Judgment
based upon the above rationale is fully supported by prior :ie--isions of the Utah Supreme court.
The defendants were entitled to have all the evidence
and inferences construed In their favor,

In Bower v, Riverton

City, 656 P2d 434 { 1 c»R2 ) , I.he Supreme Court utritrd at. page 436:
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the dbout should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must
evaluate all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the opposing summary judgment.
Tv - - - - '

•

- declrueui hial .in Jlidd^il

is not

even essentia, i: successfully contest a Motion for Summary
Judgment,

. :\ ::e r :-.«1 ~ - -

R. C. P . i

The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits, but is not required to do
so. He may stand upon his pleadings providing his
allegations, if proved, would establish a basis for
. recovery. [Christensen v. Financial Service Co., Inc.,
377 P.2d 1010 (1963) . ]
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The Motion to Dismiss clearly raised substantial and
genuine issues of law and fact.

Furthermore, defendants1 Answer,

Counterclaim, and Third-party Complaint joining the State of Utah
were filed immediately after the plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied, specifically pleading the issues with particularity.

Subsequent pleadings have fully established the

existence of genuine issues between the plaintiff and
defendants.
Ill
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING
IMMEDIATE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
The defendants do not argue that property sold in
accordance with a Sherifffs sale is not subject to rights of
redemption.

Rule 69 U.R.C.P. specifically provides a right of

redemption to a judgment debtor or a creditor having a lien by
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or
part thereof.
The trial court recognized rights of redemption, under
Rule 69, but concluded that he could not order redemption until
such time as the plaintiff clearly proved that he qualified as
one having a right to redeem.

The whole purpose of the litiga-

tion was to establish whether a right of redemption rested with
Romero (or his corporate successors in interest, namely: Golden
Circle, Inc.) or Maxfield.

Therefore, the trial court extended

-24-

t h e r i g h t s of" r n d emp t ion f o r t h e pu r p o ::> e o f »11 v i r i -1 t h»' • plniiil ill"
ai 1 o p p o r t u n i t y

to e s t a b l i s h that he had J JegaJ

right to redeem.

T h e t r i a l c o u r t c o m m i t t e d n o e r r o r by e x t e n d i n g
t h a n g r a n t i n g ri~:""::

rather

*" r e d e m p t i o n .

CONCLUSION
Based o n al 1 o f t h e a b o v e , and o n t h e record b e l o w , t h e
defendants/respondents
did

n

~ if

Summary

;

r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t that t h e trial

m," o n M

court

in d e n y i n g pi aint i I!; ' s M o t i o n for

J u d g m e n t or right to i m m e d i a t e l y

redeem.

T h e a c t s and o m i s s i o n s of t h e p l a i n t i f f have been d e l ij.nient.dl

I

I lie d e i e n d a n t s K u s h t o n w h o a r e n o w e n t i t l e d to

r e c e i v e a S h e r i f f ' s Deed to the real p r o p e r t y .
tained

They h a v e m a i n -

t h e p r o p e r t y for se\/f\n i; l ;i ) 'ear's at. great

C o n t i n u e d delay w j i i c r e a t e only m o r e h a r d s h i p

financial

risk.

for the R u s h t o n s

who in their elderly age may never sur vive more trial dates and
appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of Apri 1, 1 988
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

,^%f»^HenryC6./Nygaard
Attorney'or Respondents

_
Rushton
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Respondents to counsel for the State of Utah and counsel for
Appellant Maxfield at the addresses shown on the cover of this
Brief.
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